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ABSTRACT: This article presents the conclusions of the project Why Centralization and 
Decentralization in Federations?, which analyzed dynamic de/centralization in Australia, 
Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and the United States over their entire life span. It 
highlights six main conclusions. First, dynamic de/centralization is complex and 
multidimensional; it cannot be captured by fiscal data alone. Second, while centralization was 
the dominant trend, Canada is an exception. Third, contrary to some expectations, 
centralization occurred mainly in the legislative, rather than fiscal, sphere. Fourth, 
centralization is not only a mid-twentieth century phenomenon; considerable change occurred 
both before and after. Fifth, variation in centralization across federations appears to be driven 
by conjunctural causation rather than the net effect of any individual factor. Sixth, institutional 
properties influence the instruments of dynamic de/centralization but do not significantly affect 
its direction or magnitude. These findings have important conceptual, theoretical, 
methodological, and empirical implications for the study of federalism.  
 
 
As we noted in the introduction to this special issue of Publius, de/centralization in federations 
has been widely discussed in the literature since The Federalist but no attempt to measure it 
from a long-term comparative perspective and across its different dimensions had been carried 
out. In the mid-1970s, Riker (1975, 140) remarked that an index able to capture 
de/centralization across time and space “would make possible a truly comparative study of 
federalism for the first time.” He pointed out, however, the challenges involved in constructing 
such a measure. Others also have stressed how difficult it is to measure de/centralization 
comparatively (e.g., Davis 1978, 213n13; Simeon 1986, 446; Vaubel 1996, 80; Chhibber and 
Kollman 2004, 105).  
We have taken up the challenge, by measuring de/centralization statically (i.e., at any 
given point in time) and dynamically (i.e., over time) across six federations (Australia, Canada, 
Germany, India, Switzerland, and the United States) since their founding, and sought to explain 
the resulting patterns.1 The conceptual, methodological, and theoretical framework underlying 
the project is outlined in the introductory article. Here, we attempt a comparative analysis of 
our findings.  
We proceed as follows. Sections 2 and 3 briefly recall the theoretical expectations and 
methodological approach underpinning the project. Sections 4-6 map static de/centralization at 
the outset of each federation and in 2010, and trace the dynamic process of de/centralization in 
relation to direction, magnitude, form, tempo, and instruments. Section 7 moves from 
description to tentative explanation and offers a qualitative assessment of the theoretical 
expectations in light of the patterns emerging from our measurement. Section 8 discusses our 
findings against the backdrop of the existing literature, reflects on their significance for 
studying federalism, and identifies avenues for further research. The concluding section 





As developed in the theoretical expectations set forth in the introduction to this issue, we 
hypothesize that dynamic de/centralization is shaped by a broad range of factors operating at 
different levels and different points in time.   
The most remote factors pertain to antecedent conditions that shaped static 
de/centralization at the outset (i.e., the starting point for dynamic de/centralization). Given that 
the scope of government was much more limited in the nineteenth century compared to 
contemporary welfare states, one could expect federations created before World War I (i.e., the 
United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia) to be less centralized at birth than those 
established after World War II, namely, Germany and India. Federations born out of a “federal 
bargain” (Riker 1964, 12-16) should also start from a lower level of centralization than those 
created differently. Given that the four older federations were both established before World 
War I and emerged from a federal bargain, we expect them to have been very decentralized at 
the outset and, consequently, to have experienced considerable dynamic centralization, most 
of it occurring after 1920. 
Regarding dynamic de/centralization, several socio-economic and socio-cultural trends 
should be considered as important drivers. In the socio-economic sphere, technological change, 
increased mobility, and market integration – often placed under the umbrella of 
“modernization” – are said to fuel centralization (e.g., Beer 1973). After World War II, 
globalization might have further contributed to centralization, given the scope for the central 
government to encroach upon the autonomy of the constituent units through international 
agreements (e.g., Lazar et al. 2003, 4). Globalization’s effect is likely to have been reinforced 
by regional integration (e.g., the European Union), although we expect the latter to have had a 
different impact both geographically and depending on whether a federation is mono- or 
 
multinational. In multinational (including binational) federations, globalization and regional 
integration may temper centralization or even favor decentralization by increasing the threat of 
secession by nationally distinct units (e.g., Meadwell and Martin 1996; Lazar et al. 2003, 20). 
As regional integration has been most advanced in Western Europe, much less so in North 
America, and largely absent in South Asia and Oceania, Germany and Switzerland should have 
experienced the strongest effect of this factor, India and Australia the weakest, and Canada and 
the United States, a medium-strength effect. As the only multinational federation among our 
cases (see below), Canada will, on this basis, have experienced less centralization and possibly 
even decentralization as a result of regional integration compared to the other five federations.    
As regards the socio-cultural domain, in monolingual federations such as Australia, 
Germany and the United States, citizens’ primary identification with the constituent units can 
be expected to decline over time and their primary identification with the federation to rise. 
Multilingual federations that forge a common national identity – such as India (e.g., Stepan et 
al. 2011) and Switzerland (e.g., Dardanelli 2011) – should follow a pattern similar to that of 
the monolingual federations. In multilingual federations that become multi- or binational, such 
as Canada, the evolution of citizens’ identification should restrain centralization or even reverse 
it. The evolution of citizens’ expectations about the role of government, as represented most 
prominently by rising demands for uniform welfare services throughout the country, are likely 
to have fueled dynamic centralization in all federations (e.g., Birch 1955). 
According to a widespread consensus in the literature, these relatively slow-moving 
trends may have been reinforced or amplified by short-term shocks such as wars and economic 
crises (e.g., Wheare 1946, 254).  
We expect these trends and shocks to have led to changes in attitudes toward the vertical 
distribution of powers in the federation, principally among the general public, organized 
interests, and the media, broadly favoring an accretion of powers at the center. Pressures toward 
 
centralization, however, will be mediated by political and institutional variables that reinforc 
or weaken them. Several such variables lend themselves to theorizing. The first political 
variable is the degree of nationalization of the party system (Riker 1964, 91-101; see also 
Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 226-27). High levels of nationalization such as in Australia and 
Germany should have facilitated centralization whereas lower levels in Switzerland should 
have acted as a brake. Likewise, the rise in the degree of nationalization in the United States 
and the decline in India should have had a corresponding effect on de/centralization.2 A second 
variable in this category is the political orientation of the federal executive, whereby parties of 
the left are generally seen to favor centralization while parties of the right resist it (e.g., Döring 
and Schnellenbach 2011, 92-4). Centralizing steps are thus more likely to occur under parties 
of the left and federations having experienced longer periods of left-wing rule should have 
experienced higher centralization. A third variable is the orientation of the judicial umpire, 
whereby constitutional or supreme courts with a centralist orientation will facilitate 
centralization while those of the opposite persuasion will stem it (e.g., Livingston 1956, 12; 
Aroney and Kincaid 2017).   
Turning to institutional factors, a large number of constituent units can be seen as 
facilitating centralization (e.g., Watts 2008, 71-2). By contrast, the constituent units’ possession 
of residual powers, a dual model of federalism, separation of powers between the legislature 
and the executive, and direct-democracy approval of constitutional change should constrain 
centralization (e.g., Döring and Schnellenbach 2011, 85-90; Bednar et al. 2001, esp. 264; 
Blankart 1990, 32). Finally, in indirect-administration federations, we expect centralization to 
be confined largely to the legislative sphere, especially through growing use of framework 




DATA AND METHODS 
 
As elaborated in the introductory article, our data measure static de/centralization at ten-year 
intervals from each federation’s foundation to 2010 in twenty-two policy and five fiscal 
categories (Tables 1 and 2 in the Supplemental Online File). Each policy area is assessed as to 
its legislative and administrative de/centralization, understood as the degree of autonomy 
individual constituent units possess vis-à-vis the federation. Legislative autonomy relates to 
each constituent unit’s (i.e., canton, Land, province or state) control of primary legislative 
powers. Administrative autonomy concerns a constituent unit’s control over the 
implementation of public policy in executing federal as well as its own legislation. This yields 
data for forty-four policy scores and five fiscal scores at between seven (Germany and India) 
and twenty-three (United States) time points, which is a total of 3,871 observations. Each data 
point is intended to capture the state of de/centralization at the end of the respective decade. 
We measured the degree of a constituent unit’s legislative and administrative control in 
policy matters on a 7-point scale: 1 = exclusively the central government; 2 = almost 
exclusively the central government; 3 = predominantly the central government; 4 = equally the 
central government and the constituent units; 5 = predominantly the constituent units; 6 = 
almost exclusively the constituent units; and 7 = exclusively the constituent units. As detailed 
in the introduction to this Publius issue, we measured a constituent unit’s autonomy in the fiscal 
sphere through five different categories, each scored on 7-point scales based on either 
numerical indicators, where available, or qualitative assessment.  
We coded the degree of autonomy in each policy and fiscal area on the basis of 
constitutional and non-constitutional developments – such as the enactment of legislation and 
changes in fiscal transfers – occurring over the previous decade that either increased or 
decreased the legislative, administrative, or fiscal autonomy of the constituent units. The 
 
Supplemental Online files attached to the case-study articles of this issue detail the codes 
assigned, indicate the sources the codes are based on, and outline the justification for each 
coding decision.  
For each time point, we computed: (a) the modal and mean policy and fiscal scores, and 
the standard deviation among them; and (b) the deviation between the legislative and 
administrative policy scores by category and in the aggregate (L-A deviation), which can be 
considered a measure of the duality of a federation: the smaller the difference, the higher the 
duality.  
To measure dynamic de/centralization, we computed the following statistics: (a) the 
total, modal, and mean frequency of score change by policy and fiscal category and in the 
aggregate; (b) the patterns of direction and magnitude of score changes; (c) the cumulative 
direction and magnitude of score change by policy and fiscal category and in the aggregate; 
and (d) the mean rate of score change per year by different periods.  
 
MAPPING STATIC DE/CENTRALIZATION AT THE OUTSET 
 
Static de/centralization at the outset varied considerably across the six federations (Figure A1 
and Tables 1-3 in the Supplemental Online File). The two oldest, the United States and 
Switzerland, were highly decentralized on all three dimensions. Australia, the fourth oldest 
federation, was also considerably decentralized, albeit less so than the previous two. Canada, 
by contrast, was significantly more centralized, especially in legislation and administration. In 
all four cases, the deviation between the legislative and the administrative score was small,  
but, with the exception of Australia, greater than zero, thus indicating that most federations, 
the United States included, were never perfectly “dual”. All were least centralized in the fiscal 
sphere.   
 
The two later federations were significantly more centralized than were the United 
States and Switzerland at their founding but only marginally more so compared to Canada. 
Germany and India were also not much more centralized than the level reached by the United 
States, Switzerland and Australia by 1950 (Figures A3-A5). True to its reputation as the 
paradigmatic example of indirect administration, Germany displayed a large difference 
between the legislative and the administrative scores, and administrative centralization was 
also lower than fiscal centralization. India, by contrast, conformed more closely to the dual 
pattern of the older federations.  
There was also considerable variation across policy fields. Education (both pre-tertiary 
and tertiary), law enforcement, and environmental protection were the most decentralized – 
mean score ≥ 6 – in the legislative sphere across all six federations, whereas external affairs, 
currency and money supply, and defense were the most centralized – m an score ≤ 2. In pre-
tertiary education, external affairs, and law enforcement the distribution of powers was the 
most consistent across the six cases – standard deviation ≤ 1 – whereas there was high variation 
– standard deviation ≥ 2 – in several fields (Table 1 in the Supplemental Online File). By and 
large, a similar pattern can be observed in the administrative sphere (Table 2 in the 
Supplemental Online File). Fiscally, the proportion of own-source revenues displayed the 
lowest score, with some variation across the six federations, whereas the proportion of 
conditional grants scored highest everywhere (Table 3 in the Supplemental Online File). 3  
 





The frequency of dynamic de/centralization varied considerably across federations. In absolute 
terms, policy change was much more frequent in Australia, Switzerland and, especially, the 
United States than in the other cases. While this is, to some extent, a function of a federation’s 
age, it is not entirely so. If we adjust the figures by the length of each federation’s life span, so 
as to obtain a rate of change per decade, we observe that Australia had the highest rate, followed 
by the United States and Switzerland. Germany’s rate was not too dissimilar to that of the two 
oldest federations, whereas in India and Canada the “fed ral balance” – i.e. the distribution of 
powers between the central government and the constituent units – i  the policy sphere was 
much more stable. The frequency of policy change was higher in the legislative than in the 
administrative dimension in most cases but the reverse is true for India, while in Canada the 
two figures are equal (Tables 4 and 5 in the Supplemental Online File). 
Disaggregating by policy category, we find that legislative change was most frequent 
in agriculture, environmental protection, health care, and social welfare whereas it was least 
frequent in currency and money supply, external affairs, and civil law (Table 4 in the 
Supplemental Online File). Administrative change was most frequent in finance and securities, 
economic activity, social welfare, and the media, and least frequent in language, civil law, and 




In most federations, change was overwhelmingly centralizing, especially in the legislative 
dimension. In Australia and Switzerland, all legislative changes were centralizing and so were 
89 percent of the legislative changes recorded in the United States. Canada, however, bucked 
the trend. It experienced an equal number of centralizing and decentralizing changes in the 
policy sphere and even a higher number of decentralizing steps in the fiscal sphere. Germany 
 
and India also displayed a more mixed pattern, with a significant number of decentralizing 
steps in the legislative (Germany) and administrative (India) spheres (Tables 4-6 in the 
Supplemental Online File).   
The picture emerging is further reinforced by the data on cumulative direction over the 
entire life span of the six federations. All but Canada became more centralized, across the 
legislative, administrative and fiscal dimensions, whereas Canada became less centralized in 
all three dimensions, particularly so in the fiscal sphere (Figure A7 and Tables 7-9 in the 
Supplemental Online File).  
Examining cumulative legislative de/centralization in individual policy fields (Table 7 
in the Supplemental Online File), outside Canada, all federations became more centralized in 
every area, with the single exception of elections and voting in India. In Canada, there was 
decentralization in several fields. Not a single policy area experienced the same cumulative 
direction of change in all six federations. Centralization, however, was most consistent in 
economic activity, environmental protection, health care, and social welfare. A broadly similar 
pattern can be observed in the administrative sphere, though there were a few more instances 
of decentralization in India (Table 8 in the Supplemental Online File). The fiscal sphere 
displayed more contrast, with significant decentralization in Canada, and also in Germany and 





Mirroring some of the above patterns, the magnitude of dynamic de/centralization varied 
considerably across cases (Figure A7 and Tables 7-9 in the Supplemental Online File). Given 
their much lower static centralization at their founding, the United States and Switzerland, 
 
followed by Australia, underwent the deepest dynamic centralization, particularly so in the 
legislative sphere. Centralization had a much smaller magnitude in Germany and India, both 
of which started from markedly higher levels of static centralization. As already seen, Canada 
experienced a mix of centralizing and decentralizing steps, which produced a cumulative 
decentralization of small magnitude. While centralization in the two oldest federations was 
highest in the legislative sphere and lowest in the fiscal sphere, the pattern is reversed in 
Germany and Canada, whereas in India centralization was lowest in the administrative sphere. 
The data disaggregated by policy category show that in the legislative sphere, the 
magnitude of centralization was highest in social welfare, environmental protection, and 
agriculture whereas defense was least affected, and external affairs, with the exception of 
Canada, witnessed no change. In Canada, by far the largest magnitude of decentralization took 
place in employment relations whereas the other fields that experienced decentralization did so 
only modestly (Table 7 in the Supplemental Online File). In the administrative sphere, there 
was more variation across federations; the only pattern holding for more than one case is high 
centralization in the fields of the media, social welfare, and transport (Table 8 in the 
Supplemental Online File). Regarding dynamic fiscal de/centralization, magnitude was highest 
in the restrictions placed on own-source revenues (Table 9 in the Supplemental Online File).   
 
Pace, Timing, and Sequence  
 
In all six federations, dynamic de/centralization proceeded mostly gradually. While frequency, 
as seen above, varied considerably, in all cases change took place primarily through low-
magnitude steps. In the legislative dimension, for instance, more than 75 per cent of changes 
were of only one point (Table 13 in the Supplemental Online File). Single changes of a large 
 
magnitude, such as in employment relations in Canada or in civil and criminal law in 
Switzerland, were rare.  
There was higher variation both longitudinally within each federation and across them 
in the aggregate pace of dynamic de/centralization, with a peak of seventeen changes of policy 
score in one decade and troughs of zero in others (Figure A2). Some of these peaks, such as in 
the 1870s in Switzerland, in the 1930s and 1970s-80s in the US, and in the 1970s in Australia, 
could be considered “critical junctures”, i.e. involving high-magnitude change with significant 
long-term consequences.  
Dynamic centralization was not only a mid-twentieth century phenomenon (Figure A2). 
Noticeable centralization occurred in Switzerland and the United States as early as the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. We can also observe a high rate of change over the last two 
decades in most federations. Here too, though, Canada is an outlier, having experienced little 
change both in the initial period and in the most recent one. The rate of change in India also 
declined in the more recent period.  
Significant sequential patterns are clear in only a few cases. The shape of the dynamic 
de/centralization trend curve in the legislative sphere shows three patterns: (a) the United 
States, Switzerland, and Australia followed a largely linear path of progressive centralization; 
(b) Canada experienced decentralization in the first half of the twentieth century and 
centralization later; and (c) Germany and India underwent centralization in the earlier decades 
and moved very slightly in the opposite direction after 1980 (Figure A3).5  
Regarding sequential patterns between different forms of dynamic de/centralization, in 
both Australia and Canada, change in the fiscal sphere appears to have preceded change in the 
policy sphere, but the same did not occur in the other cases, especially Switzerland and the 
United States (Figures A2-A4). What occurred in both Australia and the United States, 
however, is that the central government expanded its fiscal capacity first and then utilized part 
 
of that capacity to constrain the states’ policy autonomy via the use of conditional transfers 




In the United States and Switzerland, where it had the highest magnitude, dynamic 
centralization took mainly a legislative form whereas significantly less centralization occurred 
in the administrative and, especially, fiscal spheres. Australia had high centralization across all 
three dimensions. In Canada and Germany there was proportionally more dynamic 
de/centralization in the fiscal and, to a lesser extent, administrative dimensions than in the 
legislative one, while India underwent proportionally less centralization in the administrative 
sphere. In the latter three federations, however, these relative differences have to be placed in 
the context of a small overall magnitude of change (Tables 7-9 in the Supplemental Online 
File).  
The different magnitudes of dynamic de/centralization across the three dimensions had 
noticeable consequences in terms of the degree of duality of each system (Figure A6). 
Switzerland, especially, but also the United States acquired a progressively more administrative 
nature over time, with the cantons and states increasingly administering federal policies. 
Although this was to be expected in Switzerland, given that the creation of an extensive central 
government administration was always out of the question, it is more remarkable in the U.S. 
case, the dual federation par excellence. Canada, India and, to a lesser extent, Australia, 
however, followed a different trajectory as their duality declined only very slightly while in 
Germany the very high administrative character of the federation decreased due to significant 





The instruments through which dynamic de/centralization unfolded varied considerably across 
cases (Table 13 in the Supplemental Online File). Constitutional amendments were paramount 
in Switzerland and prominent also in Germany and India but much less so in the other cases. 
The use of framework legislation was central to the Swiss experience and also, de facto if not 
de jure, in the United States but less significant elsewhere. The use of fiscal instruments was 
particularly prominent in Australia but to a lesser extent in the United States and virtually non-
existent in the other cases. Likewise, court rulings were crucial in the United States and also in 
Australia, Canada and India, but less so in Germany and not important in Switzerland. The 
enactment of legislation by either the central or the constituent governments was important in 
Canada and Germany but not in the other cases. The central government’s use of international 
treaty powers had some significance in all federations, particularly so in Australia, but did not 





Outside Canada, dynamic de/centralization was largely symmetrical – s ve for temporary 
situations such as Reconstruction (1865-77) in the United States. Canada, by contrast, has 
become increasingly asymmetrical since the 1960s, with a growing number of policy areas as 
well as of provinces affected, Quebec in particular.  
 
MAPPING STATIC DE/CENTRALIZATION TODAY 
 
 
The dynamics outlined above produced the contemporary patterns of static de/centralization 
presented in Figure A8 and Tables 10-12 in the Supplemental Online File. The general picture 
is less variation across federations than at the outset, as indicated by the drop in the standard 
deviation figures. There is also similarity across the six cases in that centralization is highest 
in the legislative sphere and, except for Germany, lowest in the fiscal sphere.  
Differences remain significant however, two of them especially so. The first concerns 
the degree of legislative de/centralization. While five of the six federations cluster around a 
score of 3, Canada is one whole point less centralized. The second concerns the degree of 
duality, as measured by the legislative-administrative deviation. Here, the contrast between 
Switzerland, Germany, and the United States at one end, and Canada and Australia at the other 
end is substantial. 
Disaggregating by policy and fiscal category reveals similarity in some of them but also 
several instances of large variation across cases. In the legislative sphere (Table 10 in the 
Supplemental Online File), pre-tertiary education and law enforcement are the most 
decentralized across the board, whereas currency and money supply, defense, citizenship and 
immigration, and external affairs are the most centralized, and consistently so. The most 
striking differences are the following: (a) much lower centralization in employment relations 
and, to a lesser extent, finance and securities in Canada compared to the five other cases; (b) 
much lower centralization of civil law in Canada, Australia, and the United States vis-à-vis 
Germany and Switzerland; (c) lower centralization of criminal law in Australia and the United 
States compared to most other cases; (d) much lower centralization of tertiary education in 
Canada and Germany compared to Australia and India; and (e) much lower centralization of 
media regulation in Germany compared to the five other cases. 
Broadly similar patterns prevail on the administrative side (Table 11 in the 
Supplemental Online File), though differences are slightly less pronounced. The main 
 
exception is the much lower centralization of media regulation in Germany compared to the 
other cases, while there is also noticeable variation in tertiary education and social welfare.  
Fiscally (Table 12 in the Supplemental Online File), decentralization is lowest 
regarding restrictions on own-source revenues and transfer conditionality, while it is highest, 
and consistently so, in the proportion of conditional grants. Variation is high in all categories 
apart from the proportion of conditional grants, with Canada often at the most decentralized 
end of the spectrum. Also noteworthy is the contrast between a high proportion of own-source 
revenues and high transfer conditionality (albeit within a low volume of conditional transfers), 
displayed by Switzerland and the United States, and the opposite pattern of low own-source 
revenues but also low conditionality (and very low volume of conditional transfers) in 
Germany.  
 
TOWARD AN EXPLANATION OF DYNAMIC DE/CENTRALIZATION IN 
FEDERATIONS 
 
In this section, we assess the hypotheses outlined above, and elaborated in the introduction to 
this Publius issue, against the comparative evidence from the six cases.  
 
Static de/centralization at the outset 
 
The hypothesis that older federations as well as federal-bargain federations would be less 
centralized at the outset is broadly confirmed but only weakly so for Canada. As seen above 
and in the article on Canada in this special issue, Canada in 1870 was considerably more 
centralized than were the United States and Switzerland at the outset, and only slightly less so 
than Germany in 1950.6 Canada’s initially high centralization can be explained, however, by a 
 
set of contingent factors that do not invalidate the general theoretical point that changing 
expectations of government played an important role in shaping the different federal balances 
generally observed in the older federations compared to the newer ones. The much smaller gap 
between the initial levels of de/centralization in Germany and India, and the levels reached by 
most older federations by 1950 underscores the point.   
The related hypotheses that the older federations would experience higher dynamic 
centralization, the bulk of which would take place after 1920, are confirmed except for Canada. 
While three of the older federations did experience much higher centralization than the newer 
ones, Canada did not. Likewise, while, generally speaking, the bulk of centralization in the 
older federations did occur after 1920, significant centralizing steps were taken in Switzerland 
and the United States as early as the later nineteenth century. Thus, to a sizeable extent, the 
magnitude of dynamic centralization is a function of the initial level of static de/centralization; 
hence, Canada’s experience is not surprising. There is more to its “deviant” experience, 
however, than its rather centralized nature at birth (see Lecours on Canada in this issue); hence, 




The expectation that all federations become more centralized over time as a result of socio-
economic modernization is confirmed in most cases but Canada is an exception. The modest 
legislative decentralization undergone by Germany and India since 1980 is also noteworthy. 
Besides, there are prominent differences across the six cases regarding the impact of 
modernization in specific policy fields. For instance, technological change was an important 
centralizing factor in defense in Switzerland, but not in the United States. The advent of motor 
vehicles spurred centralization in road transport in Australia and the United States, but not in 
 
Canada. The evolution of the media went hand in hand with centralization in Switzerland, but 
not in Germany.7 This suggests that modernization, though important, does n t inevitably foster 
centralization but may interact in complex ways with other factors.  
The expectation of a generalized centralizing influence emerging from globalization 
finds only limited support. It is at odds with Canada’s experience and only weakly consistent 
with that of the other cases, except for Australia (see Fenna on Australia in this issue). We can 
thus say that globalization’s slightly centralizing effects are overshadowed by the consequences 
of other, more powerful, factors. Similarly, the hypothesis that regional integration would have 
a centralizing effect in mononational federations but a decentralizing effect in multinational 
ones, is confirmed, but its effect is generally weak. Even in Germany and Switzerland, the two 
federations most exposed to it (although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, 




The hypothesis that citizens’ growing identification with the federation would fuel 
centralization in mononational federations (both mono- and multilingual) while the presence 
of competing nationalisms would hinder it in multinational federations is well supported. By 
and large, this appears to be the case for Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Australia, 
Germany and India, where identification with the federation was already strong at the outset 
and did not grow appreciably over time, offer less scope for assessing this expectation.  
The hypothesis that citizens’ changing expectations of the role of government would 
facilitate centralization is also confirmed, but not without qualifications. Canada withstood 
centralization in several key policy areas despite citizens’ growing demand for government 
 
services and regulation, while expectations changed less in the German and Indian federations 
given their shorter life spans.       
 
Economic and security shocks 
 
The experience of most federations only mildly supports the expectation that economic and 
security shocks were major factors in fostering centralization. Although there is evidence that 
significant spurts in centralization coincided with wars and economic crises, many centralizing 
steps were taken in the absence of such shocks, similar shocks had different effects in different 
federations, and wartime centralization was sometimes followed by post-war restoration of 




The expectation that collective attitudes about the federal balance would change because of the 
above trends and shocks and, in turn, create incentives and constraints for political agency vis-
à-vis de/centralization is broadly confirmed. We have found considerable evidence that the 
attitudes of citizens and interest groups, in particular, played an important role. Contrast, for 
instance, the deeply-felt preference for policy uniformity in Germany with the strong desire for 
provincial go-it-alone in many fields in Canada. 
          
Political agency 
 
The hypothesis that dynamic de/centralization would closely correlate with party system 
nationalization finds only limited support. Although it is consistent with the experiences of 
 
Australia8 and Canada, it is less so with those of Switzerland and the United States, which had 
comparatively lower party-system nationalization but high centralization. It is also at odds with 
India’s trajectory, where a steep decline in the degree of party-system nationalization did not 
yield a commensurate level of decentralization, contrary to Friedrich’s (1968, 64) expectation.  
Regarding ideology, we do find evidence, particularly in Australia, that centralizing 
steps tend to be more closely associated with parties of the left but the association is weaker 
than expected. Centralization also occurred under the tenure of parties of the right, which, 
notwithstanding some of their pronouncements, rarely engaged in serious decentralizing 
efforts. Often, ideology seems to matter more in rhetoric than in action.  
By contrast, the hypothesis that de/centralization dynamics are heavily shaped by 
judicial preferences – in systems where a constitutional or supreme court is the ultimate umpire 
– finds strong support, particularly with regard to Australia, Canada and the United States. In 
these federations, courts adopted different perspectives on the federal balance at different times 
and such changes of perspective significantly influenced the trajectory of de/centralization. 
This, however, should be put into the context of the literature on courts and judicial review, 
which notes that judicial behavior is rarely at odds with mainstream public opinion and the 




Lastly, none of the hypotheses regarding institutional properties finds significant empirical 
support.  
The expectation that federations with a smaller number of constituent units would 
experience less centralization is consistent with Canada’s experience; it is, however, strongly 
at odds with Australia’s trajectory, the federation with the fewest constituent units in our 
 
sample and yet high centralization. Nor does the considerable difference in the number of 
constituent units between Switzerland and the United States seems to have had a discernible 
influence on the similar centralization trajectory in the two countries, while Germany and India, 
given their higher initial level of static centralization, are weak tests for this hypothesis. Thus, 
the number of constituent units, by itself, had little or no detectible influence on dynamic 
de/centralization. In conjunction with other factors, however, it can be an important variable, 
as indicated by Canada’s experience (see below).  
The hypothesis that federations whose constituent units possess residual powers would 
experience less centralization is also rejected. Canada, whose provinces have no residual 
powers, actually experienced modest decentralization, whereas Australia, Switzerland, and the 
United States, all of which reserve residual powers to their constituent units, experienced high 
centralization. Possessing residual powers seems not to have helped Germany’s Länder retain 
their autonomy more successfully than India’s states either.   
The proposition that indirect-administration federations would experience higher 
centralization than direct-administration ones performs only marginally better. It would be 
difficult to claim that the dual federations resisted centralization more successfully than did 
their more administrative counterparts. Australia and the Unites States show that dual 
federations experienced high centralization too. Moreover, Canada’s ability to withstand 
centralization appears to have had little to do with its dual nature (see Lecours on Canada in 
this issue). Perhaps more surprisingly, even the hypothesis that centralization would be 
confined to the legislative sphere in the indirect-administration systems is not supported fully. 
It is strongly confirmed for Switzerland but not for Germany, where centralization was actually 
slightly more significant in the administrative sphere, or the United States, the epitome of a 
dual federation, which experienced more centralization in the legislative sphere than in the 
administrative sphere. 
 
The hypothesis that parliamentary federations would experience higher centralization 
than non-parliamentary ones finds no support either. Although it is confirmed in Australia’s 
case, it is at odds with the experience of Switzerland and the United States, which are non-
parliamentary federations that experienced high centralization, as well as with Canada’s path, 
a parliamentary federation that became less centralized. In Canada, moreover, parliamentarism 
facilitated the emergence of a system of “federal-provincial diplomacy” (Simeon 1972) that 
played a significant role in stemming centralization.  
Direct democracy’s hypothesized role as a brake on centralization also largely failed to 
materialize. The two federations with a direct-democracy requirement for constitutional 
change, Australia and Switzerland, are among those that centralized the most. While in both 
cases direct democracy occasionally placed significant obstacles in the way of centralization, 
it was not, in the main, a major bulwark against it. Table 13 in the Supplemental Online File 
summarizes our assessment of these hypotheses.  
 
In a nutshell 
 
What emerges from this evidence is that dynamic de/centralization is the product of an 
interaction of factors operating at different levels. Two main forms of interaction appear to be 
prominent. The first is that structural factors such as socio-economic and socio-cultural change 
shape intervening variables such as public attitudes to the federal balance, which, in turn, 
induce political actors to engage in de/centralizing steps, in a “funnel of causality” process 
(Campbell et al. 1960, 24-32; Hofferbert 1974, 225-34; see also Gerber and Kollman 2004, 
398). As we attempt to represent in stylized form in Figure A9, dynamic de/centralization can 
be seen as a succession of de/centralizing steps occurring over time, each of them the product 
of such a “funnel of causality”. The second form of interaction is that, at each level of the 
 
“funnel”, different factors operate in conjunction, in some cases reinforcing, and in other 
contrasting, each other. Patterns of collective identification, for instance, can compound the 
effect of growing expectations of government in one federation but temper it in another. The 
combination of these two forms of interaction produces complex causal paths, which we need 
to be sensitive to in attempting to account for variation across federations.  
We can summarize this section as follows:  
First, there are wide-ranging structural forces at work in the socio-economic and socio-
cultural spheres, occasionally reinforced by economic and security shocks, that produce 
pressures in most federations to expand the scope and reach of the central government at the 
expense of the autonomy of the constituent units. After World War II, these forces have also 
been augmented somewhat by globalization and, in some areas, by regional integration.  
Second, these largely common forces interact, however, with the widely different 
structural features of each federation and are thus refracted in different ways in different 
contexts. Prominent among those structural features are the degree of integration of the 
economy and the relative strength of collective identification with the constituent units 
compared with the federation as a whole.  
Third, the product of these interactions thus shapes collective attitudes about the federal 
balance differently in different federations. High economic integration and strong identification 
with the federation tend to foster centralization; where these conditions are weaker, public 
attitudes tend to resist centralization and even favor decentralization.  
Fourth and finally, political actors – themselves, of course, also influenced by the 
structural features of each federation – respond to the incentives and constraints presented by 
the different patterns of collective attitudes within the institutional framework of each 
federation. The latter influences the instruments through which de/centralization occurs but 
does not fundamentally affect its other properties, such as its direction and magnitude.  
 
Thus, two federations as different as the United States and Switzerland, though both 
with high economic integration and strong citizen identification with the federation, 
experienced a similar process of dynamic centralization, albeit by following different paths. 
Canada, by contrast – where the constituent units are few, mostly large, weakly integrated 
economically, commanding strong citizen identification (going as far as the second largest of 
them considering itself a stateless nation), and equipped with powerful executives – with tood 
centralization to the extent of moving from being the most centralized of the pre-World War I 
federations to being the most decentralized of our six cases today (see also Esman 1984; Smiley 
1984; and Simeon and Radin 2010).  
 
DYNAMIC DE/CENTRALIZATION AND THE STUDY OF FEDERALISM 
 
These findings have important conceptual, methodological, theoretical, and empirical 
implications for the study of federalism.   
Empiricaly, they provide support for widespread claims (e.g., Corry 1941, 216; 
Wheare 1946, 252-3; Sawer 1969, 117-30) that democratic federations tend to become more 
centralized over time. Our findings substantiate these claims with detailed evidence capturing 
variation across federations, dimensions, and categories, over the long run. As a result, 
federations tend to become more similar to each other, in terms of static de/centralization, over 
time. A necessary qualifier, however, is that centralization is neither inevitable nor 
unidirectional. It only applies where certain conditions are present; where they are not, different 
de/centralization dynamics can unfold.  
The second empirical implication is that centralization generally takes primarily a 
legislative form. Contrary to some predictions (e.g. Philip 1954, 99; Sawer 1969, 117-30; Oates 
1972, 226-7), there was less significant change in the fiscal (although Australia and Germany 
 
are important exceptions) and administrative spheres. Consequently, the constituent units of 
most federations retained considerable fiscal autonomy but saw their policy roles become 
increasingly administrative, thus blurring the traditional distinction between the direct- and 
indirect-administration types of federalism, as Sawer (1969, 117-30) predicted. Given that the 
legislative autonomy of the constituent units is a defining feature of a federation, these trends 
could, if sustained, ultimately put the survival of federalism as a distinct form of polity in doubt. 
This chimes with fears long present in the literature. In late nineteenth-century Switzerland, for 
instance, opponents of the unification of civil law codes warned that such a step would turn the 
cantons into prefectures like the French departments, thus ending the country’s federal system 
(Kölz 2006, 484-5). Corry (1941, 217), Birch (1955, 290), Friedrich (1968, 24), Duchacek 
(1970, 348), and Elazar (1981), among others, expressed similar concerns.     
Conceptually, these implications underscore the value of treating de/centralization as 
multi-dimensional, first by distinguishing between a static and a dynamic perspective, then by 
distinguishing between the legislative, administrative, and fiscal dimensions, and subsequently 
by disaggregating each of them into their individual components, such as individual policy 
areas and distinct fiscal categories. The pattern of evolution in each of these dimensions and 
categories is often very different; only by being sensitive to this variation can we grasp the 
complex nature of dynamic de/centralization.   
These conceptual implications have clear parallels in the methodological field. Given 
the complex nature of these dynamics, and their impact primarily in the legislative rather than 
fiscal sphere, fiscal data alone cannot capture them. This is true, it should be noted, not only of 
fiscal indicators that measure capacity – such as the proportion of central government revenues 
or expenditures out of total government revenues/expenditures – but also of those measuring 
autonomy, such as the ones we have employed in this study. Although this is not a novel claim 
– more than forty years ago, Pommerehne (1977, 308) acknowledged the limitation of using 
 
fiscal data to capture de/centralization dynamics – it is important to restate it, given the still 
widespread reliance on fiscal indicators alone. Nor would a single index of “party congruence”, 
as proposed by Riker (1975, 137-9), capture these dynamics, not least because it would be too 
prone to short-term fluctuations, whereas our findings show that dynamic de/centralization is 
cumulative and mostly slow-moving.  
From a theoretical perspective, four implications appear particularly noteworthy. The 
first, as already noted, is the conjunctural nature of the causal process shaping dynamic 
de/centralization. Individual factors may have no or a different effect in some cases but be 
causally important in conjunction with other factors in other cases. Second, and contrary to 
other findings (Erk and Koning 2010), multilingualism – as opposed to multinationalism – does 
not per se appear to be an important determinant of dynamic de/centralization, as the 
experiences of Switzerland and India testify. Third, the contrast between the causal effects of 
multilingualism and those of multinationalism underscores the importance of the connection 
between nationalism and federalism to understanding how the latter evolves. Friedrich’s (1968, 
30-6) claim that federalism and nationalism are intimately linked is thus still valid. Fourth, and 
arguably most important, our findings show how much stronger structural socio-economic 
factors are in shaping the evolution of federations compared to institutional or partisan features, 
thus vindicating the “sociological” approach to federalism advanced by scholars such as 
Livingston (1956) and Friedrich (1968).  
The final implication regards avenues for further research. Given the small number of 
cases, on one side, and the multiple properties of dynamic de/centralization as well as the high 
number of potential causal factors, on the other, we have only been able to conduct a qualitative 
assessment at the macro level of the causal effects of individual factors, interacting with each 
other in complex ways. We have only scratched the surface in trying to understand how and 
why key de/centralizing steps occur. There is thus considerable scope for micro analyses of 
 
such steps able to fully explore the causal chains that determine them. We hope the framework 




Dynamic de/centralization is a complex phenomenon that needs to be parceled into its different 
dimensions and time periods to be understood fully. Federations have generally become more 
centralized over time but primarily so in the legislative sphere, than in the administrative and 
fiscal spheres. Where this did not happen, as in Canada, it appears to be the product of the 
interaction of several factors; chief among them is the country’s binational nature. Institutional 
properties channel dynamic de/centralization through different paths but do not fundamentally 
affect its direction or magnitude. These findings both substantiate and challenge several 
prominent claims put forward in the literature and have multiple implications for the study of 
federalism. They also suggest promising avenues for further research on the determinants and 
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Figure A1 Mean static de/centralization at the outset 
Note: * core mean=proportion of own-source revenues plus proportion of conditional 
transfers divided by 2; †data for Canada are provided for 1880 because no core fiscal mean is 
available for 1870. 
 
 



















Figure A2  Frequency of dynamic policy de/centralization by decade*  
*Note: *number of code changes in both the legislative and the administrative dimensions. 
 























Figure A3 Mean static legislative de/centralization, 1790-2010 
 
























Figure A4 Mean static administrative de/centralization, 1790-2010 
 
























Figure A5 Mean static fiscal de/centralization, 1790-2010* 
*Note: core mean=proportion of own-source revenues plus proportion of conditional transfers 
divided by 2 
 
 





















Figure A6 Legislative-administrative mean deviation, 1790-2010 
 
























Figure A7 Cumulative dynamic de/centralization, outset-2010 
 
























Figure A8 Mean static de/centralization, 2010 
*Note: core mean=proportion of own-source revenues plus proportion of conditional transfers 
divided by 2 
 
 





















Figure A9 Stylized causal model of dynamic de/centralization 
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1 The data set is available on the project website at https://de-centralisation.org.    
2 Given that no longitudinal data on party system nationalization are available, our estimates 
of the degree of nationalization are based on a qualitative assessment. Table 13 in the 
Supplemental Online File reports data for 2010.  
3 Cross-case comparability of the data on own-source revenues and the proportional of 
conditional transfers is reduced by the fact that the data include local governments in some 
cases but not others.  
4 Although frequency is an aspect of what we call tempo, for ease of presentation we discuss it 
separately.   
5 Space limitations prevent discussion of the temporal de/centralization patterns in each policy 
and fiscal category, but the data are available upon request.  
6 As seen above, Germany was actually more decentralized administratively. 
                                               
 
                                                                                                                                                  
7 Where it spurred harmonization through enhanced horizontal co-operation (see Kaiser and 
Vogel on Germany in this issue). 
8 In Australia, the magnitude of centralization actually exceeded the degree of nationalization 
of the party system (see Fenna on Australia in this issue).  
 
 
 
